

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, OCTOBER 1,
1974 (SALT TWO-452)

1. FBS: SHCHUKIN (A-616) DREW MAY'S ATTENTION EMPHATICALLY TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS SAYING THAT FORWARD BASED FORCES MUST BE "TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION" AND NOT SAYING THAT THOSE FORCES SHOULD BE "ELIMINATED". HE SAID HE FELT THAT FBS COULD NOW BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE TWO SIDES PERHAPS HAVING DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO HOW THE FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

2. BELETSKY (TO ROWNY, A-614) REPEATED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT US NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT BASED IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND ON CARRIERS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE DID NOT, AS HE HAD LAST SPRING, SPEAK TO WITHDRAWALS.

3. FINAGIN ASKED FITZGERALD (A-617) WHEN AMB JOHNSON WOULD RESPOND TO SEMENOV'S STATEMENTS ON FBS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WERE ONE OR TWO NEW NUANCES IN TODAY'S SOVIET STATEMENT. FITZGERALD ASKED WHETHER THE REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED

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RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR ALLEGEDLY POSED BY FBS WAS ONE OF THOSE

NUANCES. FINAGIN AND BUDENTSEV AVOIDED A DIRECT RESPONSE BUT SAID THAT A CAREFUL READING OF THE STATEMENT WOULD REVEAL THE NUANCES. FITZGERALD SAID THAT AFTER FIVE YEARS OF SALT, HE DOUBTED THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW FOR HIM TO HEAR ABOUT SO-CALLED FBS.

4. MIRVS: IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MIRVS, SHCHUKIN NOTED (TO MAY, A-616) THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO HAVE MIRVS IF THE US DID. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE NUMBER OF MIRVS COULD BE LIMITED BUT DID NOT GIVE A CLEAR ANSWER WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT MIRV THROW-WEIGHT COULD BE LIMITED.

5. KARPOV (TO KLOSSON, A-615) QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FORMULATE A MEANINGFUL MEASUREMENT FOR MIRVS THAT WOULD COVER SUCH DISPARATE ELEMENTS AS NUMBERS, THROW-WEIGHT AND REENTRY VEHICLES. KLOSSON EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA COULD BE WORKED OUT. KARPOV THEN ASKED HOW THE PROPOSAL ON MIRVS RELATED TO BOMBERS. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT BOMBERS DID NOT CARRY MIRVED WEAPONS.

6. ON THE ISSUE OF MIRV LIMITATIONS, SMOLIN (TO EARLE, A-613) INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THREE VARIABLES WERE INVOLVED -- I.E., NUMBERS OF MIRV LAUNCHERS, THEIR THROW-WEIGHT, AND NUMBER OF RVs. HE THEN ASKED IF THE U.S. WERE PROPOSING A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THESE VARIABLES FOR INCORPORATION INTO AN AGREEMENT. EARLE TOLD HIM THAT PERHAPS A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA COULD BE USED, OR PERHAPS THERE WERE OTHER MEANS OF REACHING A RESULT WHICH WAS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, BUT AT THIS TIME THE US WAS NOT OFFERING A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION; RATHER, WE HOPED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY THE SUGGESTIONS MADE AND GIVE US THEIR VIEWS. SMOLIN COMMENTED THAT WE HAD FURTHER COMPLICATED THE PROBLEM OF DEALING WITH MIRVS, BUT CONCEDED THAT THE US STATEMENT WAS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST.

7. BUDANTSEV (TO FITZGERALD, A-617) SAID IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE U.S. APPROACH TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS -- SPECIFICALLY THOSE ON MIRVS. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY NEW U.S. CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE MORE EQUITABLE THAN ITS PROPOSAL TO FREEZE MIRV DEVELOPMENT AS OF JANUARY 1, 1973, A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE LEFT THE USSR WITHOUT ANY MIRVS IN THE FACE OF

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HEAVY U.S. MIRV DEPLOYMENTS. HE ADDED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY MUST APPLY TO MIRV LIMITATIONS AS WELL AS ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT.

8. REDUCTIONS: SHCHUKIN (TO MAY, A-616) SAID HE UNDERSTOOD US WAS TALKING ABOUT SMALL REDUCTIONS, THE PRINCIPAL VALUE OF WHICH WOULD BE POLITICAL. MAY SAID THERE WERE AT LEAST THREE ARGUMENTS TO BE MADE FOR REDUCTIONS. ONE WAS POLITICAL IN THE SENSE THAT

IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING TO SIGNAL A DOWNTURN IN THE ARMS COMPETITION. THE SECOND WAS ECONOMIC. ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENCES WOULD BE NEEDED AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT TO MAKE THESE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE DOWNWARD DIRECTION, THERE WOULD BE A TENDENCY FOR BOTH SIDES TO MAKE THESE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UPWARD DIRECTION. BOTH SIDES MIGHT BUY UNNECESSARY SYSTEMS. SHCHUKIN OBJECTED THAT, SINCE SYSTEMS HAD A FINITE LIFETIME, MUCH OF THE CHANGE BETWEEN NOW AND 1985 WOULD IN ANY CASE BE NECES-
SITATED BY MODERNIZATION, AND THEREFORE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS WOULD BE SMALL. WHEN MAY POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD BE QUITE A DIFFERENCE IN COST BETWEEN, FOR INSTANCE, A FORCE WHERE WE TRIED TO EQUAL THEM IN MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT AND ONE WHERE THEY CAME DOWN TO OURS, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO DESTROY SILOS, ADDING "PERHAPS A HUNDRED OR SO, BUT NOT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER" COULD BE DESTROYED. MAY NOTED THAT PERHAPS SOME MEASURE OR COMBINATION COULD BE FOUND WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE DESTRUCTION OF SILOS BETWEEN NOW AND 1985 MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. SHCHUKIN DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER. THE THIRD ARGUMENT MAY GAVE FOR REDUCTIONS WAS THAT OUR NEGOTI-
ATING EFFORTS MIGHT WELL BE FACILITATED IF BOTH SIDES KNEW AT THE OUTSET THAT, IN THE END THE TWO SIDES WOULD END UP WITH REDUCED FORCES. UNCERTAINTY ON THIS POINT MIGHT COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. BOMBER PAYLOAD: BELETSKY ASKED ROWNY (A-614) HOW THE US WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE PAYLOAD OF ITS BOMBERS. HE SAID THE US BOMBER PAYLOAD, COMPUTED BY MULTIPLYING 450 B-52'S BY 35 TONS EACH, WOULD MAKE THE TOTAL OF THROW-WEIGHT PLUS AN ALLOWANCE FOR BOMBERS TIP IN FAVOR OF THE US.

10. BUDANTSEV (TO FITZGERALD, A-617) SAID THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF BOMBER PAYLOAD WAS THE SAME AS HAD BEEN EXPLAINED BY SEMENOV AT A PREVIOUS SESSION -- NAMELY, THE MAXIMUM LOAD OF BOMBS AND ASMS
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WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL BOMBER OF THE TYPES TO BE LIMITED COULD CARRY.

11. WHAT IS "BALANCE"? KARPOV (TO KLOSSON, A-615) SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE CONCEPT OF BALANCE IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP REALLY MEANT. HE SAID HE FOUND IT VAGUE AND ABSTRACT AND COULD NOT SEE HOW ONE COULD MEASURE AND ARRIVE AT SUCH A BALANCE. SECONDLY, HE DID NOT KNOW WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A BALANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE COULD SAY THAT A BALANCE ALREADY EXISTED SINCE EACH SIDE COULD DESTROY THE OTHER MANY TIMES OVER. IN THE PRESENCE OF SUCH OVERWHELMING POWER, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS MEANT BY BALANCE.

12. SOVIET POSITION. FITZGERALD TOLD BUDENTSEV (A-617) THAT, WHILE HE ASSUMED SEMENOV WAS PRESENTLY MERELY OUTLINING THE SOVIET APPROACH AND WOULD THEN SPELL OUT SOVIET PROPOSALS IN MORE

DETAIL, HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE SOVIET POSITION AND THAT EVERYTHING THEY HAD TO DISCUSS NOW HAD ALREADY BEEN TABLED IN THEIR OCTOBER, 1973 DRAFT AGREEMENT. BUDANTSEV SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION BUT WHEN PRESSED WOULD SAY ONLY THAT INCORPORATION OF "RESTRAINT" IN THE PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT WAS NEW. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON SUCH THINGS AS ASMS, SLCMS, ETC. WOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE AVOIDED A DIRECT ANSWER AS TO WHETHER THEIR VIEWS ON SUCH RESTRAINTS WERE THE SAME. HE GAVE A VAGUE INDICATION OF AGREEMENT WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE 600-KM. RANGE STILL APPLIED TO SLCMS AND SAID THERE WOULD BE ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS IN DUE TIME. JOHNSON

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